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This paper argues that six conditions must be met to conclude that issue voting exists:
(1) candidates must take different positions on the issues of the day; (2) the campaign
issues must be salient to the voter; (3) voters must have a position on the issue; (4) voters
must accurately perceive candidate positions; (5) issue-based candidate evaluations must
be consistent with vote intention; and (6) vote intention must be based on a previously
established issue evaluation not vice versa. This study estimates the number of voters who
were able to meet these conditions for issue voting during the 1972 presidential election
campaign.
Among the numerous questions about voting behavior addressed
by the students of mass political behavior is the question of issue
voting,.’ Issue voting concerns political analysts because it ties
the ritual of voting to broader theories of democratic control
and representation. At a minimum, proponents of issue voting
argue, a system in which the mass population votes on the basis
of issues is more democratic than a system where policy issues
play no role. Issue voting increases the potential for the reflection
of the public will in policy by both making that will clear to
decision makers and making responsiveness by decision makers
more difficult to avoid.
Authors’ Note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of
the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, April 1-3, 1976. The data
presented here were gathered under National Science Foundation Grant GS-35408,
Robert D. McClure and Thomas E. Patterson, principal investigators. We would like
to thank Professors Patterson and McClure for the use of their data and for their many
helpful comments. We would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments on this manuscript.
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Resolving the question of the extent of issue voting in the
American electorate has been handicapped by the quality of the
data available. Brody and Page (1972) specify that at the very
least data are required that measure the voters’ position on
an issue, the voters’ perception of the candidates’ positions on
the issue, and the salience of the issue to the individual voter.
In addition to these three measures, Brody and Page argue,
panel data is necessary to resolve questions concerning the
extent of issue voting since the simple correlation between issue
preferences and vote choice could result either from issue voting
or from respondents’ rationalizing their issue positions in terms
of a previously decided vote choice.
Using data with all the characteristics that Brody and Page
demand, this study will provide evidence for a general model of
issue voting. First, the conditions which are individually neces-
sary and jointly sufficient will be discussed and grouped into
environmental conditions, relevance conditions, perceptual
conditions, and behavioral conditions. Second, data from the
1972 general election campaign will be used to determine the
extent to which each of these conditions is met by the electorate.
Finally, the paper will examine the joint existence of all these
conditions in the electorate and the implications of these findings
for future studies of voting behavior.
CONDITIONS FOR ISSUE VOTING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
Environmental conditions are those conditions necessary
before a voter can cast an issue ballot that are totally outside
the immediate control of the voter.2 Before issue voting can
occur, candidates must take different positions on the issues
of the day. This environmental condition has three elements.
First, it requires that elections have issue content. Clearly, some
elections such as the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections
(Pomper, 1972) and some state and local races lack this issue
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content, thus preventing any issue-based choice. Second, candi-
dates must take a stand on these issues. If candidates refuse to
take stands on issues, vacillate in their stands, or present am-
biguous positions,3 then voters have rlo clear guidelines about
how a candidate would act if elected. Third, candidates must
take positions that are different though not necessarily opposite.4
If candidates take identical positions, then voters cannot ration-
ally choose between candidates on the basis of issues.
The next two conditions for issue voting may be termed
&dquo;relevance&dquo; conditions because they indicate whether or not the
environmental conditions are relevant to the individual voter.
Before we can expect a voter to cast an issue-based vote, he
must be aware that the actions of the candidates bear on policies
of personal importance. This implies that the voter cares about
some of the issues in the campaign and has a real attitude on
those issues used to evaluate the candidates.
SALIENT ISSUES
Election issues have no meaning to the electorate if the issues
are not salient to a number of voters. If the candidates present
issues of marginal interest to the voters, only the irrational voter
(or the voter with a surplus of time and energy) would spend the
time necessary to learn candidate positions and cast a policy
vote. The issues in the campaign, therefore, must be salient to
the voters.
THE EXISTENCE OF ATTITUDES
If the campaign presents issues and the issues are salient to
the voter, then the next step in the process of issue voting is
for the voter to evaluate candidate positions in terms of his own
policy preferences. This implies that the voter has policy pref-
erences. Since many scholars have argued that mass publics
do not hold real attitudes on policy issues (see Converse, 1964;
Hennessy, 1970), the existence of political attitudes must be
established empirically. If respondent attitudes vary greatly from
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week to week in an election campaign, then the actual existence
of the attitudes must be questioned; and the relevance of the
issue for voting purposes is greatly diminished.
ACCURATE PERCEPTIONS .
Perceptual conditions are those conditions which translate the
actions of elite political actors into terms meaningful to the
voter. Similar to relevance conditions, perceptual conditions
have as a prerequisite the initial environmental conditions;
that is, environmental conditions are necessary for the per-
ceptual conditions but are not sufficient. For a voter to cast an
issue vote he must accurately perceive the political world, espe-
cially the candidates’ issue positions.
Although a voter could believe he was voting on the basis of
issues without correct information on candidate positions, the
act could not properly be termed &dquo;issue voting&dquo; since the vote
would not have the intended effect of promoting a particular
policy position. Previous studies of issue voting have directed
a great deal of attention to the question of perceptual accuracy
(Campbell et al., 1960). By determining the perceptions of the
voters to be inaccurate, the analysts assumed that the hypothesis
of issue voting could also be rejected. Since accurate perceptions
are a necessary condition for issue voting, this deduction is valid.
The analysis should not stop there, however, since perceptions
may be inaccurate either because the voters lack the necessary
cognitive capacities (as is usually argued) or because one or
more of the other necessary conditions (absence of issues, am-
biguous positions, and so on) may be lacking. An additional
benefit of accurate perceptions, if other conditions hold, is that
voters will perceive differences between the candidates on the
issues, thus permitting a choice between candidates.
The behavioral conditions of issue voting tie the cognitive
and electoral process to the actual voting act. To verify the
existence of issue voting, the researcher must find some correla-
tion between issues and votes and find that issues determine
votes rather than vice versa.
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ISSUE VOTE COVARIATION
The most frequently recognized condition for issue voting is
that the voter’s issue preferences be correlated with his vote.
For a ballot to be considered an issue vote, the voter must support
the candidate nearest him on the issues salient to the voter.
This covariation has been established by several other scholars
of voting behavior (Pomper, 1972; Boyd, 1972; Miller et al., 1976;
Kirkpatrick et al., 1975).
THE DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY
Even if all five previously noted conditions existed simul-
taneously, they would not be sufficient for issue voting. The
congruence of issue preferences and vote preferences may exist
for reasons other than actual issue voting. The voter may, for
example, decide how to vote on the basis of any number of
criteria and then align his issue positions to coincide with his
previously established vote. Such issue position rationalization
might meet the five other conditions but could not be termed
issue voting. For issue voting to occur the respondent must
first have established issue preferences and then decide how to
vote on the basis of those preferences. The direction of causality,
therefore, between issue preferences and vote preferences is
important.
DATA AND METHODS
Assessing policy voting requires that several variables central
to a rational evaluation of policy options be measured (Brody
and Page, 1972). An adequate study must measure the voter’s
perception of candidate positions, the voter’s position on the
issue, the salience of the issues to the voter, and the voter’s vote
intention. This research will operationalize the above measures
within the bounds of a single attitude theory, that of Fishbein
(1967; also Fishbein and Coombs, 1974). The data also must be
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collected in a panel survey format similar to the designs of People’s
Choice and Voting so that the direction of causality between
issues and vote choice can be determined.
RESPONDENTS’ EVALUAT10N OF THE ISSUES
The position respondents take on political issues will be
defined as their attitude toward that issue (attitude is defined
as affect for or against a psychological object).5 Operationally,
according to Fishbein, attitudes can be measured on seven-point
scales with the attitude object as the stimulus and with bipolar
adjectives with evaluative connotations as the poles of the seven-
point scale (Osgood et al., 1957). More simply, respondents
will be asked to evaluate an issue position (e.g., reducing military
spending) on seven-point good/bad scales. Respondents’ atti-
tudes were measured on military spending, amnesty, McGovern’s
$20,000 tax proposal, government spending, law and order,
welfare recipients working, busing, political corruption, govern-
ment guaranteed jobs, Vietnam withdrawal, and honoring
foreign commitments.
PERCEIVED CANDIDATE POSITIONS
The respondents’ perceptions of candidate positions will be
measured as the respondents’ beliefs about the candidate. Using
the normal Fishbein definition, a belief is the perceived prob-
ability that two psychological objects are related in a certain way.
If the two objects are a political issue and a candidate for a
political office, a person’s belief would be his feeling that some
relationship existed between a candidate and that issue; a belief
would be the respondent’s perception of the candidate’s issue
stand. Operationally, the respondent’s beliefs can be measured
and scaled on seven-point scales with likely/unlikely poles
using a stimulus that links a candidate and an issue position
(e.g., Richard Nixon favors spending less money on the military).
Two beliefs were measured for each issue, one for each candidate.
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VOTE INTENTION
A behavioral intention is the probability that a person will
take some action, either favorable or unfavorable, toward an
object. If the object were a political candidate, a person’s be-
havioral intention would be his inclination to support that
candidate. A behavioral intention toward a candidate, therefore,
corresponds with a voter’s vote intention. Two seven-point
scales assessing the probability of voting for Richard Nixon or
George McGovern were used to measure behavioral intention.
Fishbein’s attitude theory not only precisely defines some
previously ambiguous terms but also specifies exactly how
attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral intentions are interrelated.
Fishbein’s theory holds that a person’s behavioral intention
toward some object will be consistent with the person’s beliefs
about that object and other objects, and the person’s attitudes
toward those other objects related to the initial object, all other
relationships being equal. Fishbein’s (1967) research has con-
firmed that attitudes and beliefs are strongly related to behavioral
intentions and that the association is strongest when the product
of an individual’s attitudes and beliefs are summed.
where
I = an individual’s behavioral intention toward an object
bi = the strength of belief &dquo;i&dquo; about the object, i.e., the probability
or improbability the object is related to some other object &dquo;a&dquo;
ai = the evaluative aspect of the belief, i.e., the attitude toward the
related object
N = the number of beliefs held about the object by the individual.
Applying the Fishbein formula to voting behavior, the summa-
tion of the product of a voter’s issue positions and his perceptions
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of candidate positions becomes the voter’s issue-based candidate
evaluation. A strong association between issue positions and
vote intention requires that a voter’s vote intention be positively
related to his issue positions and perceptions of candidate posi-
tions. In other words, the probability of voting for a candidate
is a function of whether or not that candidate’s issue positions
coincide with those of the voter. The advantages of the Fishbein
theory are obvious. First, if the respondent takes no position on
an issue, that issue does not contribute to his issue preference
score. Second, intensely held positions contribute more than
weakly held positions to the issue preference score. Third, each
voter defines his own information about candidates’ issue stands;
no assumption is made that the voters possess perfect informa-
tion. If a voter is unaware of the candidates’ stands on an issue,
that issue does not contribute to his issue preference score.
Since an election forces a choice between two candidates and,
therefore, two sets of evaluations, the formula developed by
Fishbein must be adapted to a two-candidate situation. This
can be done simply by subtracting the evaluation of one candi-
date from the other (designated &dquo;vote intention&dquo;) and the sub-
traction of the issue preferences of one candidate from the other
(designated &dquo;issue-based candidate preference&dquo;).
SALIENCE
The Fishbein theory has no analogue to salience, assuming
for the most part that salience is reflected in a respondent’s
attitude.6 Since the concept of issue salience is important to
the study of issue voting, a separate measure of salience is neces-
sary. Salience is the importance a voter attaches to a policy
issue. Operationally, we measured salience by having respond-
ents evaluate the importance of an issue to themselves on seven-
point scales.
THE CAUSAL PRIORITIES
To determine the causal relationships between vote intention
and issue-based candidate preference, a model of the causal
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process will be constructed and predictions made from this
model. While such a procedure (or any other procedure) will
not allow the researcher to determine causality, it will allow us
to reject one of two possible causal paths. Figure 1 a depicts all
possible relationships between issue-based candidate prefer-
ence (I) and vote intention (V) with both variables measured
at two points in time.’ Note that four paths (V2 to Vi , V2 to
il) 12 to 11, and 12 to VI) were eliminated because a tempo-
rarily antecedent variable cannot be caused by a variable which
occurs at a later point.
Since the model contains eight paths and six correlations that
can be calculated, further assumptions are necessary to identify
the model’s equations, specifically that issue-based candidate
preference can affect vote intention only after a time lag and
vote intention can affect issue-based candidate preference only
after a time lag.’ This assumption eliminates the path from
vote 2 to issue 2 and from issue 2 to vote 2, and leaves the
identified model in Figure 1 b. Our purpose then is to estimate
which causal linkage (Vi to V2 or 11 to V2 ) is stronger. Assum-
ing issued-based candidate preference is a cause of vote inten-
tion, vote intention at time 2 should become more congruent
with issue-based candidate preference measured at time 1.
Because issue preference would not be affected by vote inten-
tion under this assumption, its change relative to vote choice
should be random, reducing the congruence between vote
choice at time I and issue-based candidate preference at time 2.
Under this assumption the parameter estimate for the true
causal path should be larger than the parameter estimate for
the other path.
To determine which of the two causal paths to reject, Heise
(1970) suggests using path analysis to estimate the parameters
of the model in Figure 1 b. If the path from vote intention at
time 1 to issue-based candidate preference at time 2 (pI2 V1 ) is
larger than the path from issue preference at time 1 to vote in-
tention at time 2 (PV2 I1 ), then vote intention is causally prior
to issue-based candidate preference. If py j 1 exceeds p, 2v~ ,
issue-based candidate preference is more likely to be causally
prior.
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Figure I : Models of the Casual Relationship Between Vote Intention (V) and Issue-Based
Candidate Preference (I)
DATA
During the 1972 general election campaign for president, we
conducted a panel survey of registered voters in the Syracuse
metropolitan area similar to the Lazarsfeld surveys of the 1940s.
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Three preelection personal interviews, each of which lasted about
90 minutes, were conducted. During the first wave, September 7
through 18, 731 respondents were interviewed. In the second
wave, October 7 through 15, 650 respondents were reinterviewed.
In the third wave, October 30 through November 6, 650 of our
original respondents were contacted again. Overall, 626-or
86%-of the original panel were interviewed three times prior to
the election. Respondents were selected through normal survey
research random clustering techniques and interviewed by pro-
fessionally trained interviewers.
CONDITIONS FOR ISSUE VOTING:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
Were issues important in the 1972 presidential campaign?
Did candidates take different positions on these issues? The
1972 election was perhaps the most issue-centered election in
recent history. Although the war in Vietnam was largely Viet-
namized, the general conduct of foreign policy, the status of our
support for Vietnam, and the question of amnesty were raised by
the election. On the domestic front the social issue (i.e., busing,
crime, welfare, abortion, and the like) remained salient with
George Wallace’s primary campaign. The post-1960s recession
reestablished unemployment, inflation, and government spend-
ing as crucial issues. Watergate emphasized corruption as a
central issue. These and other issues (health care costs, minority
rights, and so on) provided a solid core of issues for the campaign.
We must establish, however, not only the existence in the
abstract of potential issues but also that the public actually
perceived that the &dquo;issues&dquo; constituted public problems. As a
measure of the voters’ perceptions of public problems, we asked
each voter in our sample to indicate the one political problem
that mattered most to him personally. Although such a procedure
will not exhaust public concerns since it asks for only a single
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problem per respondent and asks for a &dquo;self-regarding&dquo; problem,
the responses provide a good indication of the problems voters
wanted candidates to address in their campaign.
From the responses to our question about public problems
(see Table 1) and the brief summary of conditions at the time of
the election, we can be confident that the setting of the 1972
presidential election was quite conducive to the development
of issues and consequently the response to issues-issue voting.
Although our survey does not cover all the issues in Table 1, it
does include the issues deemed most important by three-fourths
of the sample.
The mere presence of perceived and actual public problems is
not an adequate environment for issue voting. Candidates must
take stands (preferably different stands) on the issues, or voters
selecting a candidate on the basis of issues can not possibly make
a choice. To determine if candidates publicly expressed positions
on the eleven issues selected for analysis, all television network
newscasts and televised campaign commercials were monitored
(see Patterson and McClure, 1976). Through a content analysis
of these broadcasts, candidates were assigned positions on these
issues. Table 2 lists these issues and shows the positions of each
candidate on the issue.9
On six issues, all position issues, Richard Nixon and George.
McGovern took different stands; these issues were military
spending, amnesty, taxes, busing, jobs, and Vietnam. Despite
the arguments of some scholars (e.g., Downs, 1957), the exami-
nation of issue voting should not omit style issues (issues with
only one real position) since a voter can rationally vote for a
candidate who is perceived as better able to conduct foreign
affairs or better able to manage the economy (see Campbell and
Meier, 1977). On style issues the belief about the candidates
becomes the deciding factor rather than the stated candidate
position (since there is no position difference). For this reason,
style issues will be retained in the analysis as an essential facet
of issue voting.
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TABLE 1
Voter’s Most Pressing Public Problem
ISSUE SALIENCE
Issue voting is an action of limited utility if the issues the
candidates present in the campaign are of only marginal concern
to the voter. Table 3 presents the average salience scores for the
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TABLE 2
Candidates’ Expressed Positions on the Issues
eleven issues included in this analysis for all three waves of the
survey. The respondents felt most issues were salient; only
busing was rated as not salient in September; and by November
the voters also rated busing as salient. The &dquo;average&dquo; respondent
indicated that a wide variety of issues were personally salient.
Only 4.3 percent of the respondents indicated three or less issues
were salient, with three of every five respondents indicating that
at least seven of the eleven issues were salient.
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TABLE 3
Perceived Salience of 1972 Campaign Issues
*positive scores indicate the issue is perceived as salient, items are scored on a seven-
point scale from +3 (extremely important) to -3 (extremely unimportant).
Average number of issues perceived as salient 8.56
% with 3 or less 4.3
% with 4-7 37.6
% with 8-11 58.1
ATTITUDE STABILITY
Issue voting requires that the voter have stable policy prefer-
ences as criteria to evaluate the candidates. Table 4 presents
the percentage of the respondents holding stable attitude posi-
tions on the eleven issues during the campaign and the auto-
correlation for each attitude item. The autocorrelations reveal
inadequate attitude stability (ranging from .3 for government
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TABLE 4
Stability of the Respondents’ Attitudes
spending to .66 for amnesty with a mean correlation of .47’°).
Examining only the autocorrelation, however, is misleading.
First, we ought to expect some real change and not expect auto-
correlations of 1.0. Second, since the respondents are confronted
with unfamiliar stimuli and are responding with unfamiliar
survey instruments, the attitude scales must be taken as only
an indicator of the respondents’ real position. A more appro-
priate indicator of attitude stability would be if the response
remains on the same side of the scale or if the respondent is not
sure about his attitude both times he is tasked. 11 These stability
percentages demonstrate a moderate to high amount of stability
in the attitudes used in this study; the items ranged from 59.6%
stable on military spending to 82.9% on law and order with a
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mean percentage of 70.1. The magnitude of these percentages
demonstrates that for many people real attitudes exist on some,
though not all, issues.
BELIEF ACCURACY
Obviously, the voter cannot cast policy votes unless the
candidates’ actual positions on the issues are known. If the voter
has a distorted perception of candidate positions, then a vote
based on such information would not have the intended impact.
Table 5 presents the percentage of respondents who hold the
correct perception on each of the candidates’ positions. Although
little information is required, on the average issue less than one
respondent in four incorrectly perceives a candidate’s positions
The accuracy of respondent perceptions varies dramatically by
issue and by candidate. Although the reasons for this variation
are beyond the scope of this article, perceptual accuracy is
probably a function of the ambiguity and frequency of candidate
messages.
Do the accurate perceptions of candidate positions translate
into perceived differences between the candidates? As Table 6
shows, they obviously do. Table 6 classifies perceived differences
as either &dquo;small&dquo;-where the difference might be as little as one
scale position-and &dquo;opposite&dquo;-where one candidate was
perceived as supporting the issue and one was perceived as
opposing. On the average issue 80% of the respondents perceived
some differences while 42% perceived opposite positions. Clearly
most voters were able to perceive differences between Richard
Nixon and George McGovern even on several issues where
differences were at most minimal,13
ISSUE-VOTE COVARIATION
The first necessary behavioral condition of issue voting and
the one that has most concerned political analysts is the covari-
ation between issue-based candidate preference and vote inten-
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TABLE 5
Percentage of Respondents Who Correctly Perceived
Candidate Positions By Issue
*Percentage of correct perceptions among respondents who perceived the candidate took a stand on
the issue.
tion. The four previous conditions necessary for issue voting
are sufficiently met so that some covariation between issue and
vote could be expected. The data indicate that (1) an environment
conducive to issue voting existed, (2) voters held positions on
the issues of the day, (3) voters perceived these issues as salient,
and (4) the voters accurately perceived candidate positions. This
section will determine the extent to which the potential issue
voting electorate actually converted their issue preferences
into votes.
Respondents’ issue-based candidate evaluations and vote
intentions were strongly related during the 1972 presidential
election, and the relationship strengthened as election day
approached. Using all eleven issues combined via the modified
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TABLE 6
Percentage Perceived Differences in
Candidate Positions
Fishbein formula, the cross-sectional correlation between vote
intention and issue preference was .64 in September, it increased
to .69 in October, and further increased to .73 by November. On
a simpler level, 86% of the respondents cast ballots consistent
with their issue-based preferences by the November interview.
ISSUES AND VOTES: THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP
The final necessary condition to be examined is the determina-
tion of the causal relationship between issue-based candidate
preference and vote intention. If the dominant causal relation-
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ship between the two variables is from issue preference to vote
intention, then we can be fairly sure that some voters are engaging
in issue voting, since they are aligning their vote intention with
their previously established issue preferences.
The paths which serve as indicators of the causal relationship
are shown for all voters in Table 7. For all three possible combi-
nations of measurements, the vote intention to issue-based
candidate preference path (the rationalizing path) is larger than
the issue preference to vote preference path. Despite the signifi-
cant differences between the two path coefficients, the path
coefficients for the issue dominant path are not zero as they
should be if the issue to vote relationship were spurious.
Before we accept the conclusion that the voter’s decision is
not based on issues and that the issue-vote covariation is a result
of widespread voter rationalization, the statistically significant
issue-to-vote paths suggest that we entertain at least one plausible
rival hypothesis. Examining the change process and the statistics
used to measure the change is necessary to determine why both
the issue voting and the rationalizing paths are strong. The cross-
lagged technique is sensitive to change in either issue-based
candidate preference or vote intention and is relatively insensitive
to stable preferences. The changes can be of two types-changing
a preference from one candidate to the other or strengthening
or weakening one preference (but not changing to the other
candidate). The following hypothesis should be considered. Let
us assume the voter is a rational issue voter. This voter decided
on the basis of his own positions and the candidates’ announced
positions that candidate X is his preference early in the cam-
paign. Now the rational voter would not freeze his preferences
at this moment but rather would continue to monitor the po-
litical environment. As new issues arise, as the candidates clarify
their stands, and as events increase the salience of different
issues, our voter incorporates these factors into his issue prefer-
ence. If, as is usually expected, these events reinforce the voter’s
decision, we have a case of issue-based candidate preference
becoming more aligned with vote intention of what statistically
appears as rationalization. But this voter cannot be dismissed
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TABLE 7
Path Coefficients for Panel Model of Issue-Based
Candidate Preference (I)-Vote Intention
(V) Relationships
as a rationalizing voter because this voter may have initially
decided according to policy issues and has since continued to
incorporate political information. Such a voter cannot auto-
matically be dismissed as &dquo;irrational.&dquo;
Testing this rival hypothesis poses some difficulties since the
vote decision in most instances occurred before our survey was
in the field. We can offer only two unsatisfying partial tests.
First, was the dominant form of change among stable voters rein-
forcement ? The mean issue-based candidate preference scores for
the stable McGovern and Nixon voters in September were
-4.48 and 3.08 respectively (preference for McGovern is desig-
nated as negative). For the same voters, November issue-based
candidate preference scores increased to -5.45 and 3.69 respec-
tively. In the aggregate, stable voters did reinforce their issue-
based candidate perceptions. Examining individual voter
changes during the campaign would also reveal that small, vote-
consistent change was the most prevalent type of change.
Together these facts indicate that the predominant form of
change among stable voters was reinforcement of a previous
vote decision.
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Second, did the voters who were undecided in September vote
consistently with their previously established issue preferences?
Of the September undecideds 15% did not vote, 30% cast ballots
against their September issue preference (though not neces-
sarily their November preference) and 55%o voted consistent
with their issue preferences. Finding a large portion of issue
voters among late deciders, those voters least likely to have the
motivation and possibly the skills to cast policy oriented ballots,
raises serious doubt on the original finding of rationalization.
We can be sure at least some portion of the sample fulfills the
conditions necessary for issue voting.
JOINT SUFFICIENCY . 
’ 
’
Until now we have addressed each of the necessary conditions
individually. More important for the process of issue voting
than whether or not each condition is met by each voter is
whether or not the entire sample or some subset of the sample
meets all conditions jointly. This section will examine the extent
to which our voters meet the salience, the perceived differences,
the perceptual accuracy, and the attitude stability conditions
simultaneously. We will also assess the degree to which re-
spondents who meet the perceptual and relevance conditions
also meet the first behavioral condition of covariance. Since
environmental conditions are outside the control of voters, we
will assume they are met (bearing in mid that the absence of
any of the environmental conditions will attenuate issue voting).
In addition, the survey was not in the field during the decision
time for most respondents; therefore, the causality question
cannot be answered directly for our sample of voters. Since issue
voting requisites may well vary with the individual (some indi-
viduals needing less information and motivation than others to
cast a policy-oriented vote), two different levels of meeting the
necessary conditions will be considered.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016apr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
43
JOINT EXISTENCE: THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
To cast an &dquo;issue vote,&dquo; the voter should meet the following
minimal perceptual and relevance conditions. First, the voter
must perceive at least minor differences between the candidates;
that is, the voter should either see the candidates on opposite
sides of the issue or perceive the candidates differ in their em-
phasis on the issue. Second, the minimal condition for belief
accuracy is perceiving the candidate to be on the side of the issue
he actually is without consideration of the certainty that the
voter attaches to that perception. If the candidate position was
coded as positive and the voter assigns the candidate a positive
position, then the belief is considered accurate. To cast an issue
vote, the voter must know the position of both candidates. ~4
Third, attitude stability need be only minimal in the sense that
if the respondent can locate himself on the same side of the issue
twice in a row, the attitude is considered stable. Finally, a salient
issue under the least stringent case is an issue that is evaluated
as salient, though not necessarily extremely salient, to the voter.
Any voter meeting these conditions on any one issue will be
termed a member of that issue’s issue public. A voter needs to
belong to only one issue public to be a potential issue voter.
Clearly, this set of criteria involves the minimal expectations
that one can demand on perceptual and relevance conditions and
still designate the process issue voting. The absence of any of
these minimal conditions, in the authors’ opinion, is sufficient
grounds to conclude that issue voting is unlikely.
Table 8 shows the percentage of respondents in each issue
public meeting the minimum criteria for issue voting. The size of
issue publics for individual issues ranges from 6.8% of the elec-
torate for corruption to 36.8% in the case of Vietnam. On the
average issue 21.2% of the respondents meet all four perceptual
and relevance conditions simultaneously. Although Table 8 by
itself would indicate that few voters were members of issue
publics, Table 9 shows this is not the case. Of the respondents
in this survey 81 % were included in one or more issue publics
and, thus, have the potential for casting issue votes. No re-
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TABLE 8
Percent of Respondents Meeting All Four Perceptual
and Relevance Conditions by Issue
spondent was a member of more than eight issue publics; the
average respondent belonged to two or three issue publics.
JOINT EXISTENCE: THE STRINGENT CONDITIONS
The skeptic could dispute the evidence presented thus far by
claiming that we have set the conditions for issue voting at a
minimum, a minimum that does not reflect the difficulties in-
volved in issue voting. To consider the criticism of the skeptic
and to attempt to set a lower limit on the number of issue voters,
more stringent conditions for issue voting were established.
First, to perceive an issue as salient under these conditions,
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TABLE 9
Number of Issues on Which Each Respondent Meet All Four
Perceptual and Relevance Conditions
the respondent must &dquo;strongly agree&dquo; that X is the most impor-
tant issue. If the respondent did not mark the extreme response
on the salience question, the issue was considered not salient
to the voter. Second, attitudes were considered &dquo;real&dquo; under
the most stringent conditions only if the respondent’s attitude
varied one scale point or less from September to November. This
procedure allows some random variations (which can be attrib-
uted to the measurement instrument) but does not permit large
fluctuations. Third, the perceptual accuracy conditions combine
both perceptual accuracy and certainty. To be considered an
&dquo;accurate&dquo; belief, the respondent’s belief must not only be on
the correct side of the issue, but must indicate that he is certain
of his response. The respondent would then be extremely certain
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that the candidate held the position indicated. Finally, the differ-
ences the respondent perceives between the candidates must be
large. A difference was determined to be significant only if the
respondent saw one candidate on one side of the issue and the
other candidate on the other side of the issue; minor differences
were not counted. This criterion eliminates any issue voting
on style issues.
The percentage of respondents jointly meeting all four neces-
sary conditions under the stringent conditions are listed by issue
in Table 8. The percentages are small compared to the minimal
conditions. Vietnam (11.7%) and amnesty (7.7%) were excep-
tions to the general pattern that less than 5% of the respondents
were able to perceive large differences between candidates when
they were very certain about candidate positions, thought the
issue was very salient, and had highly stable attitudes. Only 2.7%
of the respondents were able to meet these conditions on the
average issue (5.0% on position issues). Table 9 shows that the
number of respondents who belong to one or more issue publics
shrinks rapidly under these conditions. Only 21.7% of the re-
spondents belonged to one or more issue publics, and more than
half of those belonged to only one issue public.
By examining the joint existence of the four perceptual and
relevance conditions under both sets of conditions, we can
establish an estimate of the upper and lower limit of issue voting
thus far. Permitting a voter to be classified as a potential issue
voter if he met the four conditions on one or more issues, we
get a lower limit of 21.7% and an upper limit of 83.5%. Clearly
the range of these figures is so large as to limit the usefulness
of the analysis. The reader should bear in mind that these per-
centages only indicate the number of voters who have the po-
tential (based on the perceptual and relevance conditions) to
become issue voters. Only if the environmental conditions are
met (we assumed they were met) and if the behavioral conditions
are met (see below) could these voters be classified as issue voters.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016apr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
47
BEHAVIORAL CONDITIONS
This section will determine how many issue public members
also cast their ballots for the issue-preferred candidate. A voter is
classified as meeting the behavioral condition only if the re-
spondent actually voted for the candidate nearest his own
position on the issues when all four perceptual and relevance
conditions are met. If these conditions were met on more than one
issue, then the issues were combined using Fishbein’s formula.
The respondent can then be classified as behaving consistent
with the issue publics he belongs to, behaving inconsistent with
the issue publics, or behaving neither consistently nor inconsis-
tently (the latter being the case when the respondent had a neutral
vote intention or did not belong to any issue publics).
The combination of the four perceptual and relevance condi-
tions along with the one behavioral condition of covariation will
have to serve as indicators of issue voting. Since we already know
the survey was initiated too late to tap the decisions of most of the
sample, examining the last behavioral condition would not prove
fruitful. For the minimum conditions of issue voting three of every
five voters (60.7%) jointly meet the five conditions for issue
voting while one of every six (16.3%) actually behaves incon-
sistent with his attitudes, beliefs, and salience perceptions. The
behavior for 23% of the respondents could not be classified.
Under the more stringent conditions of issue voting over 19% of
the respondents meet the five conditions simultaneously and less
than 3% exhibit inconsistent behavior with 78% unclassified.
The range of possible issue voters (19-62%) is still fairly large,
but any attempts to be more precise would necessarily be specula-
tive rather than data-based. It is difficult to specify the exact
conditions that must be met for any particular voter to engage in
issue voting. Although one voter might be able to cast a reasoned
issue vote based solely on the minimum conditions of issue
voting, other voters might need the certainty of the more stringent
conditions to cast an issue vote. In part, the conditions necessary
for issue voting are idiosyncratic because the involvement of
citizens in politics and the circumstances surrounding their vote
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016apr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
48
choice are also idiosyncratic. For this reason we believe that at the
present time and with the present data, a more exact estimate of
the extent of issue voting simply cannot be made.
NOTES
1. The studies of issue voting have proliferated to the point where a complete listing
is impossible. One of the most comprehensive lists is found in Kessel (1972) in the initial
footnote. Studies completed since that time are referenced in Margolis (1977).
2. Environmental conditions can be defined in contrast to individual conditions. If
the former are the main restrictions on issue voting, then the quality of candidates and their
campaigns restricts the extent of issue voting (see Pomper, 1972). If the latter are the key,
then individual cognitive limitations prevent issue voting.
3. An example of an ambiguous position is that of Nixon on Vietnam. Interspersed
in the election campaign are hard line statements and action coupled with "peace is at
hand" statements appealing to the doves. Other ambiguous positions include McGovern’s
on law and order, and busing, and Nixon’s on corruption and government spending.
4. For example, no candidate could oppose combating crime, at least not publicly,
thus it is classified as a style issue, on which there are no opposing positions. But the
candidates could present different solutions (e.g., combating "causes" or "giving the
, police the necessary tools"). As a result, such a style issue must be included although
opposite positions are impossible.
5. This definition of attitude follows not only that of Fishbein (1967) but also
Thurstone (1929) and Osgood et al. (1957) among others. The reader will also note the
similarity between attitude as we define it and the evaluative dimension of attitude as
proposed by Smith et al. (1956).
6. Our research indicates a relationship between attitude intensity and salience just
as the theory assumes. The average correlation for all eleven issues between intensity of
attitudes and salience of the issue is .29. This indicates that the attitude measure also taps
the salience dimension. Fishbein’s original work experimented with salience but deleted
the concept when it failed to improve predictions.
7. See Heise (1970) for a discussion of this technique. The writings in this area are too
numerous to cite. See McCullough (1978) for a discussion of alternative techniques and a
bibliography on panel analysis.
8. Assumptions involved in the crosslagged analysis include linearity, homosced-
asticity, constancy, equivalence, finite causal lags, equal causal lags, uncorrelated dis-
turbance terms, and minimal measurement error. See Heise (1970) and Pelz and Andrews
(1964) for a discussion of the assumptions involved. Heise’s model is only one of many
which could have been used, and we have examined alternative models and discovered
similar results to those reported below. We feel, however, that the above model is the most
appropriate, particularly in that it involves causation with lag rather than causation
without lag.
9. We do not argue that the positions were held with equal intensity, were thought to
be of equal importance to the candidates, or were nicely reducible to an uncomplicated
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pro-con form for the moment. We are simply presenting the general impression of their
expressed opinions and will consider some complications later.
10. To be sure, a correlation of .47 would normally be a moderate to large correlation.
In this case, however, the same variable is being measured eight weeks apart. With the
autocorrelation qualification, the size of the coefficients must be considered small.
11. The incorporation of the "not sure" respondents makes the stability percentages
conservative estimates of stability similar to the correlations. The "not sure" respondents
evidence some degree of random behavior in their responses. Such respondents are likely
to go from the "not sure" response to an extreme response, to the other extreme response,
or back to the "not sure" response. In many cases when a respondent indicates a "not sure"
response, it is likely the person is just that, not sure what attitude position he holds.
12. The data also reveal that those voters who were better educated and showed high
levels of political interest were the most likely to be accurate in their perceptions. On
salient issues, voters accurately perceived a candidate’s position whether or not they voted
for that candidate.
13. The reader should note that the perception of differences was greater where real
differences could be objectively assigned. The large percentages indicate not that lack of
perceived differences is a problem, but rather that respondents might perceive differences
that do not exist.
14. One could argue that issue voting is possible if only one candidate’s position is
known. The voter could then accept or reject this candidate on the basis of issues. If
knowing only one candidate’s position were used as the least stringent case, then 95.4% of
the electorate meet the following four conditions.
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